POMDPs under Probabilistic Semantics by Chatterjee, Krishnendu & Chmelík, Martin
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
48
46
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 22
 A
ug
 20
13
POMDPs under Probabilistic Semantics
(Full Version)
Krishnendu Chatterjee (IST Austria) Martin Chmel´ık (IST Austria)
Abstract
We consider partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) with limit-average
payoff, where a reward value in the interval [0, 1] is associated to every transition, and the
payoff of an infinite path is the long-run average of the rewards. We consider two types of path
constraints: (i) quantitative constraint defines the set of paths where the payoff is at least a
given threshold λ1 ∈ (0, 1]; and (ii) qualitative constraint which is a special case of quantitative
constraint with λ1 = 1. We consider the computation of the almost-sure winning set, where
the controller needs to ensure that the path constraint is satisfied with probability 1. Our main
results for qualitative path constraint are as follows: (i) the problem of deciding the existence of
a finite-memory controller is EXPTIME-complete; and (ii) the problem of deciding the existence
of an infinite-memory controller is undecidable. For quantitative path constraint we show that
the problem of deciding the existence of a finite-memory controller is undecidable.
1 Introduction
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Markov decision processes
(MDPs) are standard models for probabilistic systems that exhibit both probabilistic and nonde-
terministic behavior [11]. MDPs have been used to model and solve control problems for stochastic
systems [9, 22]: nondeterminism represents the freedom of the controller to choose a control action,
while the probabilistic component of the behavior describes the system response to control ac-
tions. In perfect-observation (or perfect-information) MDPs (PIMDPs) the controller can observe
the current state of the system to choose the next control actions, whereas in partially observable
MDPs (POMDPs) the state space is partitioned according to observations that the controller can
observe, i.e., given the current state, the controller can only view the observation of the state (the
partition the state belongs to), but not the precise state [19]. POMDPs provide the appropriate
model to study a wide variety of applications such as in computational biology [7], speech pro-
cessing [18], image processing [6], robot planning [14, 12], reinforcement learning [13], to name a
few. POMDPs also subsume many other powerful computational models such as probabilistic finite
automata (PFA) [23, 20] (since probabilistic finite automata (aka blind POMDPs) are a special
case of POMDPs with a single observation).
Limit-average payoff. A payoff function maps every infinite path (infinite sequence of state
action pairs) of a POMDP to a real value. The most well-studied payoff in the setting of POMDPs
is the limit-average payoff where every state action pair is assigned a real-valued reward in the
interval [0, 1] and the payoff of an infinite path is the long-run average of the rewards on the
path [9, 22]. POMDPs with limit-average payoff provide the theoretical framework to study many
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important problems of practical relevance, including probabilistic planning and several stochastic
optimization problems [12, 3, 16, 17, 26].
Expectation vs probabilistic semantics. Traditionally, MDPs with limit-average payoff have
been studied with the expectation semantics, where the goal of the controller is to maximize the
expected limit-average payoff. The expected payoff value can be 12 when with probability
1
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payoff is 1, and with remaining probability the payoff is 0. In many applications of system anal-
ysis (such as robot planning and control) the relevant question is the probability measure of the
paths that satisfy certain criteria, e.g., whether the probability measure of the paths such that the
limit-average payoff is 1 (or the payoff is at least 12) is at least a given threshold (e.g., see [1, 14]).
We classify the path constraints for limit-average payoff as follows: (1) quantitative constraint
that defines the set of paths with limit-average payoff at least λ1, for a threshold λ1 ∈ (0, 1]; and
(2) qualitative constraint is the special case of quantitative constraint that defines the set of paths
with limit-average payoff 1 (i.e., the special case with λ1 = 1). We refer to the problem where the
controller must satisfy a path constraint with a probability threshold λ2 ∈ (0, 1] as the probabilistic
semantics. An important special case of probabilistic semantics is the almost-sure semantics, where
the probability threshold is 1. The almost-sure semantics is of great importance because there are
many applications where the requirement is to know whether the correct behavior arises with prob-
ability 1. For instance, when analyzing a randomized embedded scheduler, the relevant question
is whether every thread progresses with probability 1. Even in settings where it suffices to satisfy
certain specifications with probability λ2 < 1, the correct choice of λ2 is a challenging problem,
due to the simplifications introduced during modeling. For example, in the analysis of randomized
distributed algorithms it is quite common to require correctness with probability 1 (e.g., [21, 25]).
Besides its importance in practical applications, almost-sure convergence, like convergence in expec-
tation, is a fundamental concept in probability theory, and provide stronger convergence guarantee
than convergence in expectation [8].
Previous results. There are several deep undecidability results established for the special case of
probabilistic finite automata (PFA) (that immediately imply undecidability for the more general
case of POMDPs). The basic undecidability results are for PFA over finite words: The emptiness
problem for PFA under probabilistic semantics is undecidable over finite words [23, 20, 5]; and
it was shown in [16] that even the following approximation version is undecidable: for any fixed
0 < ǫ < 12 , given a probabilistic finite automaton and the guarantee that either (a) all words are
accepted with probability at least 1 − ǫ; or (ii) all words are accepted with probability at most ǫ;
decide whether it is case (i) or case (ii). The almost-sure problem for probabilistic automata over
finite words reduces to the non-emptiness question of universal automata over finite words and is
PSPACE-complete. However, another related decision question whether for every ǫ > 0 there is a
word that is accepted with probability at least 1 − ǫ (called the value 1 problem) is undecidable
for probabilistic automata over finite words [10]. Also observe that all undecidability results for
probabilistic automata over finite words carry over to POMDPs where the controller is restricted
to finite-memory strategies.
Our contributions. Since under the general probabilistic semantics, the decision problems are
undecidable even for PFA, we consider POMDPs with limit-average payoff under the almost-sure
semantics. We present a complete picture of decidability as well as optimal complexity.
1. (Almost-sure winning for qualitative constraint). We first consider limit-average payoff with
qualitative constraint under almost-sure semantics. We show that belief-based strategies are
not sufficient (where a belief-based strategy is based on the subset construction that re-
members the possible set of current states): we show that there exist POMDPs with limit-
average payoff with qualitative constraint where finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy
exists but there exists no belief-based almost-sure winning strategy. Our counter-example
shows that standard techniques based on subset construction (to construct an exponential
size PIMDP) are not adequate to solve the problem. We then show one of our main result
that given a POMDP with |S| states and |A| actions, if there is a finite-memory almost-sure
winning strategy to satisfy the limit-average payoff with qualitative constraint, then there is
an almost-sure winning strategy that uses at most 23·|S|+|A| memory. Our exponential mem-
ory upper bound is asymptotically optimal, as even for PFA over finite words, exponential
memory is required for almost-sure winning (follows from the fact that the shortest witness
word for non-emptiness of universal finite automata is at least exponential). We then show
that the problem of deciding the existence of finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy
for limit-average payoff with qualitative constraint is EXPTIME-complete for POMDPs. In
contrast to our result for finite-memory strategies, we establish that the problem of deciding
the existence of infinite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for limit-average payoff with
qualitative constraint is undecidable for POMDPs.
2. (Almost-sure winning with quantitative constraint). In contrast to our decidability result
under finite-memory strategies for qualitative constraint, we show that the almost-sure win-
ning problem for limit-average payoff with quantitative constraint is undecidable even for
finite-memory strategies for POMDPs.
In summary we establish the precise decidability frontier for POMDPs with limit-average payoff
under probabilistic semantics (see Table 1). For practical purposes, the most prominent question
is the problem of finite-memory strategies, and for finite-memory strategies we establish decid-
ability with optimal EXPTIME-complete complexity for the important special case of qualitative
constraint under almost-sure semantics.
Technical contributions. The key technical contribution for the decidability result is as follows.
Since belief-based strategies are not sufficient, standard subset construction techniques do not work.
For an arbitrary finite-memory strategy we construct a collapsed strategy that collapses memory
states based on a graph construction given the strategy. The collapsed strategy at a collapsed
memory state plays uniformly over actions that were played at all the corresponding memory
states of the original strategy. The main challenge is to show that the exponential size collapsed
strategy, even though has less memory elements, does not destroy the structure of the recurrent
classes of the original strategy. For the computational complexity result, we show how to construct
an exponential size special class of POMDPs (which we call belief-observation POMDPs where the
belief is always the current observation) and present polynomial time algorithms for the solution
of the special belief-observation POMDPs of our construction. For undecidability of almost-sure
winning for qualitative constraint under infinite-memory strategies we present a reduction from
the the value 1 problem for PFA; and for undecidability of almost-sure winning for quantitative
constraint under finite-memory strategies we present a reduction from the strict emptiness problem
for PFA under probabilistic semantics.
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Almost-sure semantics Probabilistic semantics
Fin. mem. Inf. mem. Fin./Inf. mem.
PFA PSPACE-c PSPACE-c Undec.
POMDP Qual. Constr. EXPTIME-c Undec. Undec.
POMDP Quan. Constr. Undec. Undec. Undec.
Table 1: Computational complexity. New results are in bold fonts
2 Definitions
In this section we present the definitions of POMDPs, strategies, objectives, and other basic
definitions required throughout this work. We follow the standard definitions of MDPs and
POMDPs [22, 15].
Notations. Given a finite set X, we denote by P(X) the set of subsets of X, i.e., P(X) is the power
set of X. A probability distribution f on X is a function f : X → [0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X f(x) = 1,
and we denote by D(X) the set of all probability distributions on X. For f ∈ D(X) we denote by
Supp(f) = {x ∈ X | f(x) > 0} the support of f .
Definition 1 (POMDP). A Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) is a tuple
G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) where:
• S is a finite set of states;
• A is a finite alphabet of actions;
• δ : S × A → D(S) is a probabilistic transition function that given a state s and an action
a ∈ A gives the probability distribution over the successor states, i.e., δ(s, a)(s′) denotes the
transition probability from state s to state s′ given action a;
• O is a finite set of observations;
• γ : S → O is an observation function that maps every state to an observation; and
• s0 is the initial state.
Given s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A, we also write δ(s′|s, a) for δ(s, a)(s′). A state s is absorbing if for all
actions a we have δ(s, a)(s) = 1 (i.e., s is never left from s). For an observation o, we denote by
γ−1(o) = {s ∈ S | γ(s) = o} the set of states with observation o. For a set U ⊆ S of states and
O ⊆ O of observations we denote γ(U) = {o ∈ O | ∃s ∈ U. γ(s) = o} and γ−1(O) =
⋃
o∈O γ
−1(o).
Remark 1. For technical convenience we assume that there is a unique initial state s0 and we will
also assume that the initial state has a unique observation, i.e., |γ−1(γ(s0))| = 1. In general there
is an initial distribution α over initial states that all have the same observation, i.e., Supp(α) ⊆
γ−1(o), for some o ∈ O. However, this can be modeled easily by adding a new initial state snew with
a unique observation such that in the first step gives the desired initial probability distribution α,
i.e., δ(snew , a) = α for all actions a ∈ A. Hence for simplicity we assume there is a unique initial
state s0 with a unique observation.
4
Plays, cones, and belief-updates. A play (or a path) in a POMDP is an infinite sequence
(s0, a0, s1, a1, s2, a2, . . .) of states and actions such that for all i ≥ 0 we have δ(si, ai)(si+1) > 0.
We write Ω for the set of all plays. For a finite prefix w ∈ (S · A)∗ · S of a play, we de-
note by Cone(w) the set of plays with w as the prefix (i.e., the cone or cylinder of the prefix
w), and denote by Last(w) the last state of w. For a finite prefix w = (s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , sn)
we denote by γ(w) = (γ(s0), a0, γ(s1), a1, . . . , γ(sn)) the observation and action sequence asso-
ciated with w. For a finite sequence ρ = (o0, a0, o1, a1, . . . , on) of observations and actions,
the belief B(ρ) after the prefix ρ is the set of states in which a finite prefix of a play can
be after the sequence ρ of observations and actions, i.e., B(ρ) = {sn = Last(w) | w =
(s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , sn), w is a prefix of a play, and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n. γ(si) = oi}. The belief-updates
associated with finite-prefixes are as follows: for prefixes w and w′ = w · a · s the belief up-
date is defined inductively as B(γ(w′)) =
(⋃
s1∈B(γ(w))
Supp(δ(s1, a))
)
∩ γ−1(γ(s)), i.e., the set(⋃
s1∈B(γ(w))
Supp(δ(s1, a))
)
denotes the possible successors given the belief B(γ(w)) and action a,
and then the intersection with the set of states with the current observation γ(s) gives the new
belief set.
Strategies. A strategy (or a policy) is a recipe to extend prefixes of plays and is a function
σ : (S ·A)∗ ·S → D(A) that given a finite history (i.e., a finite prefix of a play) selects a probability
distribution over the actions. Since we consider POMDPs, strategies are observation-based, i.e., for
all histories w = (s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , an−1, sn) and w
′ = (s′0, a0, s
′
1, a1, . . . , an−1, s
′
n) such that for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n we have γ(si) = γ(s
′
i) (i.e., γ(w) = γ(w
′)), we must have σ(w) = σ(w′). In other words, if
the observation sequence is the same, then the strategy cannot distinguish between the prefixes and
must play the same. We now present an equivalent definition of observation-based strategies such
that the memory of the strategy is explicitly specified, and will be required to present finite-memory
strategies.
Definition 2 (Strategies with memory and finite-memory strategies). A strategy with memory is
a tuple σ = (σu, σn,M,m0) where:
• (Memory set). M is a denumerable set (finite or infinite) of memory elements (or memory
states).
• (Action selection function). The function σn : M → D(A) is the action selection function
that given the current memory state gives the probability distribution over actions.
• (Memory update function). The function σu : M × O × A → D(M) is the memory update
function that given the current memory state, the current observation and action, updates the
memory state probabilistically.
• (Initial memory). The memory state m0 ∈M is the initial memory state.
A strategy is a finite-memory strategy if the set M of memory elements is finite. A strategy is pure
(or deterministic) if the memory update function and the action selection function are deterministic,
i.e., σu : M × O × A → M and σn : M → A. A strategy is memoryless (or stationary) if it is
independent of the history but depends only on the current observation, and can be represented as
a function σ : O → D(A).
Probability measure. Given a strategy σ, the unique probability measure obtained given σ is
denoted as Pσ(·). We first define the measure µσ(·) on cones. For w = s0 we have µ
σ(Cone(w)) = 1,
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and for w = s where s 6= s0 we have µ
σ(Cone(w)) = 0; and for w′ = w ·a ·s we have µσ(Cone(w′)) =
µσ(Cone(w)) · σ(w)(a) · δ(Last(w), a)(s). By Caratheo´dary’s extension theorem, the function µσ(·)
can be uniquely extended to a probability measure Pσ(·) over Borel sets of infinite plays [2].
Objectives. An objective in a POMDP G is a measurable set ϕ ⊆ Ω of plays. We first define
limit-average payoff (aka mean-payoff) function. Given a POMDP we consider a reward function
r : S × A → [0, 1] that maps every state action pair to a real-valued reward in the interval [0, 1].
The LimAvg payoff function maps every play to a real-valued reward that is the long-run average
of the rewards of the play. Formally, given a play ρ = (s0, a0, s1, a1, s2, a2, . . .) we have
LimAvg(r, ρ) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
·
n∑
i=0
r(si, ai).
When the reward function r is clear from the context, we drop it for simplicity. For a reward
function r, we consider two types of limit-average payoff constraints.
1. Qualitative constraint. The qualitative constraint limit-average objective LimAvg=1 defines
the set of paths such that the limit-average payoff is 1; i.e., LimAvg=1 = {ρ | LimAvg(ρ) = 1}.
2. Quantitative constraints. Given a threshold λ1 ∈ (0, 1), the quantitative constraint limit-
average objective LimAvg>λ1 defines the set of paths such that the limit-average payoff is
strictly greater than λ1; i.e., LimAvg>λ1 = {ρ | LimAvg(ρ) > λ1}.
Probabilistic and almost-sure winning. Given a POMDP, an objective ϕ, and a class C of
strategies, we say that:
• a strategy σ ∈ C is almost-sure winning if Pσ(ϕ) = 1;
• a strategy σ ∈ C is probabilistic winning, for a threshold λ2 ∈ (0, 1), if P
σ(ϕ) ≥ λ2.
Theorem 1 (Results for PFA (probabilistic automata over finite words) [20]). The following as-
sertions hold for the class C of all infinite-memory as well as finite-memory strategies: (1) the
probabilistic winning problem is undecidable for PFA; and (2) the almost-sure winning problem is
PSPACE-complete for PFA.
Since PFA are a special case of POMDPs, the undecidability of the probabilistic winning prob-
lem for PFA implies the undecidability of the probabilistic winning problem for POMDPs with
both qualitative and quantitative constraint limit-average objectives. The almost-sure winning
problem is PSPACE-complete for PFAs, and we study the complexity of the almost-sure winning
problem for POMDPs with both qualitative and quantitative constraint limit-average objectives,
under infinite-memory and finite-memory strategies.
Basic properties of Markov Chains. Since our proofs will use results related to Markov chains,
we start with some basic definitions and properties related to Markov chains.
Markov chains and recurrent classes. A Markov chain G = (S, δ) consists of a finite set S of states
and a probabilistic transition function δ : S → D(S). Given the Markov chain, we consider the
directed graph (S,E) where E = {(s, s′) | δ(s′ | s) > 0}. A recurrent class C ⊆ S of the Markov
chain is a bottom strongly connected component (scc) in the graph (S,E) (a bottom scc is an scc
with no edges out of the scc). We denote by Rec(G) the set of recurrent classes of the Markov
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chain, i.e., Rec(G) = {C | C is a recurrent class}. Given a state s and a set U of states, we say
that U is reachable from s if there is a path from s to some state in U in the graph (S,E). Given
a state s of the Markov chain we denote by Rec(G)(s) ⊆ Rec(G) the subset of the recurrent classes
reachable from s in G. A state is recurrent if it belongs to a recurrent class. The following standard
properties of reachability and the recurrent classes will be used in our proofs:
• Property 1. (a) For a set T ⊆ S, if for all states s ∈ S there is a path to T (i.e., for all
states there is a positive probability to reach T ), then from all states the set T is reached
with probability 1. (b) For all states s, if the Markov chain starts at s, then the set C =⋃
C∈Rec(G)(s) C is reached with probability 1, i.e., the set of recurrent classes is reached with
probability 1.
• Property 2. For a recurrent class C, for all states s ∈ C, if the Markov chain starts at s, then
for all states t ∈ C the state t is visited infinitely often with probability 1, and is visited with
positive average frequency (i.e., positive limit-average frequency) with probability 1.
The following lemma is an easy consequence of the above properties.
Lemma 1. Let G = (S, δ) be a Markov chain with a reward function r : S → [0, 1], and s ∈ S a
state of the Markov chain. The state s is almost-sure winning for the objective LimAvg=1 iff for all
recurrent classes C ∈ Rec(G)(s) and for all states s1 ∈ C we have r(s1) = 1.
Markov chains under finite memory strategies. We now define Markov chains obtained by fixing a
finite-memory strategy in a POMDP G. A finite-memory strategy σ = (σu, σn,M,m0) induces a
Markov chain (S ×M, δσ), denoted G↾σ, with the probabilistic transition function δσ : S ×M →
D(S ×M): given s, s′ ∈ S and m,m′ ∈M , the transition δσ
(
(s′,m′) | (s,m)
)
is the probability to
go from state (s,m) to state (s′,m′) in one step under the strategy σ. The probability of transition
can be decomposed as follows:
• First an action a ∈ A is sampled according to the distribution σn(m);
• then the next state s′ is sampled according to the distribution δ(s, a); and
• finally the new memory m′ is sampled according to the distribution σu(m,γ(s
′), a) (i.e., the
new memory is sampled according σu given the old memory, new observation and the action).
More formally, we have:
δσ
(
(s′,m′) | (s,m)
)
=
∑
a∈A
σn(m)(a) · δ(s, a)(s
′) · σu(m,γ(s
′), a)(m′).
Given s ∈ S and m ∈M , we write (G↾σ)(s,m) for the finite state Markov chain induced on S ×M
by the transition function δσ, given the initial state is (s,m).
3 Finite-memory strategies with Qualitative Constraint
In this section we will establish the following three results for finite-memory strategies: (i) we show
that in POMDPs with LimAvg=1 objectives belief-based strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure
winning; (ii) we establish an exponential upper bound on the memory required by an almost-
sure winning strategy for LimAvg=1 objectives; and (iii) we show that the decision problem is
EXPTIME-complete.
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1
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1
2
Rec: {X,X ′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′}
MC G↾σ2
Figure 1: Belief is not sufficient
3.1 Belief is not sufficient
We now show with an example that there exist POMDPs with LimAvg=1 objectives, where finite-
memory randomized almost-sure winning strategies exist, but there exists no belief-based random-
ized almost-sure winning strategy (a belief-based strategy only uses memory that relies on the
subset construction where the subset denotes the possible current states called belief). In our ex-
ample we will present the counter-example even for POMDPs with restricted reward function r
assigning only Boolean rewards 0 and 1 to the states (the reward does not depend on the action
played but only on the states of the POMDP).
Example 1. We consider a POMDP with state space {s0,X,X
′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′} and action set
{a, b}, and let U = {X,X ′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′}. From the initial state s0 all the other states are
reached with uniform probability in one-step, i.e., for all s′ ∈ U = {X,X ′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′} we have
δ(s0, a)(s
′) = δ(s0, b)(s
′) = 16 . The transitions from the other states are as follows (shown in
Figure 1): (i) δ(X, a)(X ′) = 1 and δ(X, b)(Y ) = 1; (ii) δ(X ′, a)(Y ′) = 1 and δ(X ′, b)(X) = 1;
(iii) δ(Z, a)(Y ) = 1 and δ(Z, b)(Z ′) = 1; (iv) δ(Z ′, a)(Z) = 1 and δ(Z ′, b)(Y ′) = 1; (v) δ(Y, a)(X) =
δ(Y, b)(X) = δ(Y, a)(Z) = δ(Y, b)(Z) = 12 ; and (vi) δ(Y
′, a)(X ′) = δ(Y ′, b)(X ′) = δ(Y ′, a)(Z ′) =
δ(Y ′, b)(Z ′) = 12 . All states in U have the same observation. The reward function r assigns the
reward 1 to states X,X ′, Z, Z ′ and reward 0 to states Y and Y ′.
The belief initially after one-step is the set U = {X,X ′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′} since from s0 all of them
are reached with positive probability. The belief is always the set U since every state has an input
edge for every action, i.e., if the current belief is U (i.e., the set of states that the POMDP is
currently in with positive probability is U), then irrespective of whether a or b is chosen all states
of U are reached with positive probability and hence the belief set is again U . There are three
belief-based strategies: (i) σ1 that plays always a; (ii) σ2 that plays always b; or (iii) σ3 that plays
both a and b with positive probability. The Markov chains G↾σ1 (resp. σ2 and σ3) are obtained by
retaining the edges labeled by action a (resp. action b, and both actions a and b). For all the three
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strategies, the Markov chains obtained contain the whole set U as the reachable recurrent class. It
follows that in all the Markov chains there exists a reachable recurrent class containing a state with
reward 0, and by Lemma 1 none of the belief-based strategies σ1, σ2 or σ3 are almost-sure winning
for the LimAvg=1 objective.
The Markov chains G↾σ1 and G↾σ2 are also shown in Figure 1, and the graph of G↾σ3 is the
same as the POMDP G (with edge labels removed). The strategy σ4 that plays action a and b
alternately gives rise to the Markov chain G↾σ4 (shown in Figure 2) where the recurrent classes do
not intersect with Y or Y ′, and is a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the LimAvg=1
objective.
Xa X ′b
Y b Y ′a
Za Z ′b
Rec: {Xa,X ′b}
Z ′a Zb
Y ′b Y a
X ′a Xb
Rec: {Z ′a, Zb}
Figure 2: The Markov chain G↾σ4 .
In Example 1 the LimAvg=1 objective is not observation-based, i.e., there are states within the
same observation with different rewards. In the following example we modify Example 1 to show
that randomized belief-based strategies are not sufficient even if we consider observation-based
LimAvg=1 objectives, i.e, all states within the same observation are required to have the same
reward.
Example 2. We consider the POMDP shown in Figure 3: the transition edges in the set U =
{X,X ′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′} are exactly the same as in Figure 1, and the transition probabilities are always
uniform over the support set. We add a new state B and from the state Y and Y ′ add positive
transition probabilities (probability 13) to the state B for both actions a and b. Recall that Y and
Y ′ were having reward 0 in Example 1. From state B all states in U are reached with positive
probability for both actions a and b. All states in U have the same observation (denoted as oU ),
and the state B has a new and different observation (denoted as oB). All the states in observation
oU are assigned reward 1, and the state B in observation oB is assigned reward 0. Note that
the objective is an observation-based LimAvg=1 objective. Since we retain all edges as in Figure 1
and from B all states in U are reached with positive probability in one step, whenever the current
observation is oU , then the belief is the set U . As in Example 1 there are three belief-based strategies
(σ1, σ2 and σ3) in belief U , and the Markov chains under σ1 and σ2 are shown in Figure 3, and
the Markov chain under σ3 has the same edges as the original POMDP. For all the belief-based
strategies the recurrent class contains the state B, i.e., a state with reward 0, and by Lemma 1
are not almost-sure winning strategies for the LimAvg=1 objective. The strategy σ4 that alternates
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X X ′
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Z Z ′
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3
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3
Rec: {X,X ′, Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′, B}
MC G↾σ2
Figure 3: Belief is not sufficient
actions a and b is a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the LimAvg=1 objective and the
Markov chain obtained given σ4 is shown in Figure 4.
Za Y b Xa X ′b Y ′a Z ′b
Rec: {Xa,X ′b}
Ba Bb
X ′a Y ′b Z ′a Zb Y a Xb
Rec: {Z ′a, Zb}
Figure 4: The Markov chain G↾σ4 .
3.2 Strategy complexity
For the rest of the subsection we fix a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy σ =
(σu, σn,M,m0) on the POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) with a reward function r for the objective
LimAvg=1. Our goal is to construct an almost-sure winning strategy for the LimAvg=1 objective
with memory size at most Mem∗ = 23·|S| · 2|A|. We start with a few definitions associated with
strategy σ. For m ∈M :
• The function RecFunσ(m) : S → {0, 1} is such that RecFunσ(m)(s) is 1 iff the state (s,m)
is recurrent in the Markov chain G↾σ and 0 otherwise. (The RecFun stands for recurrence
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function).
• The function AWFunσ(m) : S → {0, 1} is such that AWFunσ(m)(s) is 1 iff the state (s,m) is
almost-sure winning for the LimAvg=1 objective in the Markov chain G↾σ and 0 otherwise.
(The AWFun stands for almost-sure win function).
• We also consider Actσ(m) = Supp(σn(m)) that for every memory element gives the support
of the probability distribution over actions played at m.
Remark 2. Let (s′,m′) be a state reachable from (s,m) in the Markov chain G↾σ. If the state
(s,m) is almost-sure winning for the LimAvg=1 objective, then the state (s
′,m′) is also almost-sure
winning for the LimAvg=1 objective.
Collapsed graph of σ. Given the strategy σ we define the notion of a collapsed
graph CoGr(σ) = (V,E), where the states of the graph are elements from the set V =
{(Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m)) | Y ⊆ S and m ∈ M} and the initial state is
({s0},AWFunσ(m0),RecFunσ(m0),Actσ(m0)). The edges in E are labeled by actions in A. There
is an edge
(Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m))
a
→ (Y ′,AWFunσ(m
′),RecFunσ(m
′),Actσ(m
′))
in the collapsed graph CoGr(σ) iff there exists an observation o ∈ O such that
1. the action a ∈ Actσ(m),
2. the set Y ′ is non-empty and it is the belief update from Y , under action a and the observation
o, i.e., Y ′ =
⋃
s∈Y Supp(δ(s, a)) ∩ γ
−1(o), and
3. m′ ∈ Supp(σu(m, o, a)).
Note that the number of states in the graph is bounded by |V | ≤ Mem∗.
In the following lemma we establish the connection of the functions RecFunσ(m) and AWFunσ(m)
with the edges of the collapsed graph. Intuitively the lemma shows that when the function
RecFunσ(m) (resp. AWFunσ(m)) is set to 1 for a state s of a vertex of the collapsed graph, then for
all successor vertices along the edges in the collapsed graph, the function RecFun (resp. AWFun) is
also set to 1 for successors of state s.
Lemma 2. Let (Y,W,R,A)
a
→ (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) be an edge in the collapsed graph CoGr(σ) = (V,E).
Then for all s ∈ Y the following assertions hold:
1. If W (s) = 1, then for all s′ ∈ Supp(δ(s, a)) ∩ Y ′ we have that W ′(s′) = 1.
2. If R(s) = 1, then for all s′ ∈ Supp(δ(s, a)) ∩ Y ′ we have that R′(s′) = 1.
Proof. We present proof of both the items below.
1. Let (Y,W,R,A)
a
→ (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) be an edge in the collapsed graph CoGr(σ) = (V,E) and
a state s ∈ Y such that W (s) = 1. It follows that there exist memories m,m′ ∈ M and
an observation o ∈ O such that (i) W = AWFunσ(m); (ii) W
′ = AWFunσ(m
′); (iii) a ∈
Supp(σn(m)); (iv) m
′ ∈ Supp(σu(m, o, a)); and finally (v) O(s
′) = o. From all the points
above it follows that there exists an edge (s,m)→ (s′,m′) in the Markov chain G↾σ. As the
state (s,m) is almost-sure winning (since W (s) = 1) it follows by Remark 2 that the state
(s′,m′) must also be almost-sure winning and therefore W ′(s′) = 1.
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2. As in the proof of the first part we have that (s′,m′) is reachable from (s,m) in the Markov
chain G↾σ. As every state reachable from a recurrent state in a Markov chain is also recurrent
we have R′(s′) = 1.
The desired result follows.
We now define the collapsed strategy for σ. Intuitively we collapse memory elements of the
original strategy σ whenever they agree on all the RecFun, AWFun, and Act functions. The collapsed
strategy plays uniformly all the actions from the set given by Act in the collapsed state.
Collapsed strategy. We now construct the collapsed strategy σ′ = (σ′u, σ
′
n,M
′,m′0) of σ based on
the collapsed graph CoGr(σ) = (V,E). We will refer to this construction by σ′ = CoSt(σ).
• The memory set M ′ are the vertices of the collapsed graph CoGr(σ) = (V,E), i.e., M ′ = V =
{(Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m)) | Y ⊆ S and m ∈M}.
• The initial memory is m′0 = ({s0},AWFunσ(m0),RecFunσ(m0),Actσ(m0)).
• The next action function given a memory (Y,W,R,A) ∈M ′ is the uniform distribution over
the set of actions {a | ∃(Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) ∈M ′ and (Y,W,R,A)
a
→ (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) ∈ E}, where
E are the edges of the collapsed graph.
• The memory update function σ′u((Y,W,R,A), o, a) given a memory element (Y,W,R,A) ∈
M ′, a ∈ A, and o ∈ O is the uniform distribution over the set of states {(Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) |
(Y,W,R,A)
a
→ (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) ∈ E and Y ′ ⊆ γ−1(o)}.
The following lemma intuitively shows that the collapsed strategy can reach all the states the
original strategy could reach.
Lemma 3. Let σ′ = CoSt(σ) be the collapsed strategy, s, s′ ∈ S, and m,m′ ∈ M . If (s′,m′) is
reachable from (s,m) in G↾σ, then for all beliefs Y ⊆ S with s ∈ Y there exists a belief Y
′ ⊆
S with s′ ∈ Y ′ such that the state (s′, Y ′,AWFunσ(m
′),RecFunσ(m
′),Actσ(m
′)) is reachable from
(s, Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m)) in G↾σ′
Proof. We will start the proof with one step reachability first. Assume there is an edge
(s,m) → (s′,m′) in the Markov chain G ↾σ and the action labeling the transition in
the POMDP is a, i.e., (i) s′ ∈ Supp(δ(s, a)); (ii) a ∈ Supp(σn(m)); and (iii) m
′ ∈
Supp(σu(m,γ(s
′), a)). Let (s, Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m)) be a state in G↾σ′ . It follows
that a ∈ Actσ(m) and there exists Y
′ ⊆ S and an edge (Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m))
a
→
(Y ′,AWFunσ(m
′),RecFunσ(m
′),Actσ(m
′)) in the collapsed graph CoGr(σ). Therefore, action
a is played with positive probability by the strategy σ′ and with positive probability the
memory is updated to (Y ′,AWFunσ(m
′),RecFunσ(m
′),Actσ(m
′)). Therefore there is an edge
(s, Y,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m),Actσ(m)) → (s
′, Y ′,AWFunσ(m
′),RecFunσ(m
′),Actσ(m
′)) in the
Markov chain G↾σ′ .
We finish the proof by extending the one-step reachability to general reachability. If (s′,m′) is
reachable from (s,m) in G↾σ then there exists a finite path. Applying the one step reachability for
every transition in the path gives us the desired result.
Random variable notation. For all n ≥ 0 we write Xn, Yn,Wn, Rn, An, Ln for the random
variables that correspond to the projection of the nth state of the Markov chain G↾σ′ on the S
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component, the belief P(S) component, the AWFunσ component, the RecFunσ component, the
Actσ component, and the n
th action, respectively.
Run of the Markov chain G↾σ′ . A run on the Markov chain G↾σ′ is an infinite sequence
(X0, Y0,W0, R0, A0)
L0→ (X1, Y1,W1, R1, A1)
L1→ · · ·
such that each finite prefix of the run is generated with positive probability on the Markov chain,
i.e., for all i ≥ 0, we have (i) Li ∈ Supp(σ
′
n(Yi,Wi, Ri, Ai)); (ii) Xi+1 ∈ Supp(δ(Xi, Li)); and
(iii) (Yi+1,Wi+1, Ri+1, Ai+1) ∈ Supp(σ
′
u((Yi,Wi, Ri, Ai), γ(Xi+1), Li)). In the following lemma we
establish important properties of the Markov chain G↾σ′ that are essential for our proof.
Lemma 4. Let (X0, Y0,W0, R0, A0)
L0→ (X1, Y1,W1, R1, A1)
L1→ · · · be a run of the Markov chain
G↾σ′ , then the following assertions hold for all i ≥ 0:
1. Xi+1 ∈ Supp(δ(Xi, Li)) ∩ Yi+1;
2. (Yi,Wi, Ri, Ai)
Li→ (Yi+1,Wi+1, Ri+1, Ai+1) is an edge in the collapsed graph CoGr(σ);
3. if Wi(Xi) = 1, then Wi+1(Xi+1) = 1;
4. if Ri(Xi) = 1, then Ri+1(Xi+1) = 1; and
5. if Wi(Xi) = 1 and Ri(Xi) = 1, then r(Xi, Li) = 1.
Proof. We prove all the points below:
1. The first point follows directly from the definition of the Markov chain and the collapsed
strategy σ′.
2. The second point follows from the definition of the collapsed strategy σ′.
3. The third point follows from the first two points of this lemma and the first point of Lemma 2.
4. The fourth point follows from the first two points of this lemma and the second point of
Lemma 2.
5. For the fifth point consider that Wi(Xi) = 1 and Ri(Xi) = 1. Then there exists a memory
m ∈ M such that (i) AWFunσ(m) = Wi, and (ii) RecFunσ(m) = Ri. Moreover, the state
(Xi,m) is a recurrent (since Ri(Xi) = 1) and almost-sure winning state (since Wi(Xi) = 1)
in the Markov chain G↾σ. As Li ∈ Actσ(m) it follows that Li ∈ Supp(σn(m)), i.e., the action
Li is played with positive probability in state Xi given memory m, and (Xi,m) is in an
almost-sure winning recurrent class. By Lemma 1 it follows that the reward r(Xi, Li) must
be 1.
The desired result follows.
We now introduce the final notion of a collapsed-recurrent state that is required to complete
the proof. A state (X,Y,W,R,A) of the Markov chain G↾σ′ is collapsed-recurrent, if for all memory
elements m ∈ M that were merged to the memory element (Y,W,R,A), the state (X,m) of the
Markov chain G↾σ is recurrent. It will turn out that every recurrent state of the Markov chain G↾σ
is also collapsed-recurrent.
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Definition 3. A state (X,Y,W,R,A) of the Markov chain G↾σ′ is called collapsed-recurrent iff
R(X) = 1.
Note that due to point 4 of Lemma 4 all the states reachable from a collapsed-recurrent state
are also collapsed-recurrent. In the following lemma we show that the set of collapsed-recurrent
states is reached with probability 1.
Lemma 5. With probability 1 a run of the Markov chain G↾σ′ reaches a collapsed-recurrent state.
Proof. We show that from every state (X,Y,W,R,A) in the Markov chain G↾σ′ there exists a reach-
able collapsed-recurrent state. Consider a memory element m ∈M such that (i) AWFunσ(m) =W ,
(ii) RecFunσ(m) = R, and (iii) Actσ(m) = A. Consider a state (s,m) in the Markov chain
G ↾σ. By Property 1 (b) of Markov chains from every state in a Markov chain the set of re-
current states is reached with probability 1, in particular there exists a reachable recurrent state
(X ′,m′), such that RecFunσ(m
′)(X ′) = 1. By Lemma 3, there exists Y ′ ⊆ S such that the state
(X ′, Y ′,AWFunσ(m),RecFunσ(m
′),Actσ(m
′)) is reachable from (X,Y,W,R,A) in the Markov chain
G↾σ′ , and moreover the state is collapsed-recurrent. As this is true for every state, we have that there
is a positive probability of reaching a collapsed-recurrent from every state in G↾σ′ . This ensures by
Property 1 (a) of Markov chains that collapsed-recurrent states are reached with probability 1.
Lemma 6. The collapsed strategy σ′ is a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the
LimAvg=1 objective on the POMDP G with the reward function r.
Proof. The initial state of the Markov chain G↾σ′ is ({s0},AWFunσ(m0),RecFunσ(m0),Actσ(m0))
and as the strategy σ is an almost-sure winning strategy we have that AWFunσ(m0)(s0) = 1. It
follows from the third point of Lemma 4 that every reachable state (X,Y,W,R,A) in the Markov
chain G↾σ′ satisfies that W (X) = 1.
From every state a collapsed-recurrent state is reached with probability 1. It follows that all the
recurrent states in the Markov chain G↾σ′ are also collapsed-recurrent states. As in all reachable
states (X,Y,W,R,A) we haveW (X) = 1, by the fifth point of Lemma 4 it follows that every action
L played in a collapsed-recurrent state (X,Y,W,R,A) satisfies that the reward r(X,L) = 1. As
this true for every reachable recurrent class, the fact that the collapsed strategy is an almost-sure
winning strategy for LimAvg=1 objective follows from Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 (Strategy complexity). The following assertions hold: (1) If there exists a finite-
memory almost-sure winning strategy in the POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) with reward function
r for the LimAvg=1 objective, then there exists a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy with
memory size at most 23·|S|+|A|. (2) Finite-memory almost-sure winning strategies for LimAvg=1
objectives in POMDPs in general require exponential memory and belief-based strategies are not
sufficient.
Proof. The first item follows from Lemma 6 and the fact that the size of the memory set of the
collapsed strategy σ′ of any finite-memory strategy σ (which is the size of the vertex set of the
collapsed graph of σ) is bounded by 23·|S|+|A|. The second item is obtained as follows: (i) the
exponential memory requirement follows the almost-sure winning problem for PFA as the shortest
witness to the non-emptiness problem for universal automata is exponential; and (ii) the fact that
belief-based strategies are not sufficient follows from Example 1.
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3.3 Computational complexity
We will present an exponential time algorithm for the almost-sure winning problem in POMDPs
with LimAvg=1 objectives under finite-memory strategies. A naive double-exponential algorithm
would be to enumerate all finite-memory strategies with memory bounded by 23·|S|+|A| (by The-
orem 2). Our improved algorithm consists of two steps: (i) first it constructs a special type of
a belief-observation POMDP; and we show that there exists a finite-memory almost-sure winning
strategy for the objective LimAvg=1 iff there exists a randomized memoryless almost-sure winning
strategy in the belief-observation POMDP for the LimAvg=1 objective; and (ii) then we show how
to determine whether there exists a randomized memoryless almost-sure winning strategy in the
belief-observation POMDP for the LimAvg=1 objective in polynomial time with respect to the size
of the belief-observation POMDP. Intuitively a belief-observation POMDP satisfies that the current
belief is always the set of states with current observation.
Definition 4. A POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) is a belief-observation POMDP iff for every
finite prefix w = (s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , an−1, sn) the belief associated with the observation sequence
ρ = γ(w) is the set of states with the last observation γ(sn) of the observation sequence ρ, i.e.,
B(ρ) = γ−1(γ(sn)).
3.3.1 Construction of the belief-observation POMDP
Given a POMDP G with the LimAvg=1 objective specified by a reward function r we construct
a belief-observation POMDP G with the LimAvg=1 objective specified by a reward function r,
such that there exists a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy ensuring the objective in the
POMDP G iff there exists a randomized memoryless almost-sure winning strategy in the POMDP
G. We will refer to this construction as G = Red(G). Intuitively, the construction will proceed as
follows: if there exists an almost-sure winning finite-memory strategy, then there exists an almost-
sure winning strategy with memory bounded by 23·|S|+|A|. This allows us to consider the memory
elements M = 2S × {0, 1}|S| × {0, 1}|S| × 2A; and intuitively construct the product of the memory
M with the POMDP G. First we define the set of winning memories MWin ⊆M defined as follows:
MWin = {(Y,W,R,A) | for all s ∈ Y we have W (s) = 1}
Note that every reachable memory m of the collapsed strategy of any finite-memory almost-sure
winning strategy σ in the POMDP G must belong to MWin.
We proceed with the formal construction: let G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) be a POMDP with a reward
function r. We construct a POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) with a reward function r as follows:
• The set of states S = Sa ∪ Sm ∪ {s0, sl}, consists of the action selection states Sa = S ×M ;
the memory selection states Sm = S × 2
S × A ×M ; an initial state s0 and an absorbing
loosing state sl.
• The actions A are A∪M , i.e, the actions A from the POMDP G to simulate action playing
and the memory elements M to simulate memory updates.
• The observation set is O = (M)∪ (2S ×A×M)∪ {s0} ∪ {sl}, intuitively the first component
of the state cannot be observed, i.e., the memory part of the state remains visible; and the
two newly added states do have their own observations.
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• The observation mapping is then defined γ((s,m)) = m, γ((s, Y, a,m)) = (Y, a,m), γ(s0) = s0
and γ(sl) = sl.
• As the precise probabilities do not matter for computing almost-sure winning states under
finite-memory strategies for the LimAvg=1 objective we specify the transition function only
as edges of the POMDP graph and the probabilities are uniform over the support set. We
define the transition function δ in the following steps:
1. For every memory element m ∈ MWin ∩ {({s0},W,R,A) | ({s0},W,R,A) ∈ M} we add
an edge s0
m
→ (s0,m). Intuitively the set from which m is chosen contains all the possible
initial memories of an almost-sure winning collapsed strategy.
2. We will say an action a ∈ A is enabled in the observation (Y,W,R,A) iff (i) a ∈ A,
and (ii) for all ŝ ∈ Y we have if W (ŝ) = 1 and R(ŝ) = 1, then r(ŝ, a) = 1. Intuitively,
a collapsed strategy would only play enabled actions, therefore every action a ∈ A
possibly played by a collapsed strategy remains available in the state of the POMDP.
This fact follows from the fifth point of Lemma 4. For an action a ∈ A that is enabled
in observation (Y,W,R,A) we have an edge (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→ (s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A))
iff both of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) s′ ∈ Supp(δ(s, a)); and (ii) Y ′ =⋃
ŝ∈Y Supp(δ(ŝ, a))∩γ
−1(γ(s′)), i.e., the belief update from belief Y , under action a and
observation γ(s′). For an action a ∈ A that is not enabled, we have an edge to the
loosing absorbing state sl, i.e., (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→ sl.
3. We will say an action (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′) ∈ M is enabled in the observation
(Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) iff (i) for all states ŝ ∈ Y , if W (ŝ) = 1, then for all ŝ′ ∈
Supp(δ(ŝ, a)) ∩ Y ′ we have W ′(ŝ′) = 1, and (ii) for all states ŝ ∈ Y , if R(ŝ) = 1,
then for all ŝ′ ∈ Supp(δ(ŝ, a)) ∩ Y ′ we have R′(ŝ′) = 1. Observe that by Lemma 2,
the memory updates in a collapsed strategy correspond to enabled actions. For an
action m that is enabled in the observation (Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) we have an edge
(s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A))
m
→ (s′,m); otherwise we have an edge to the loosing absorbing
state sl, i.e., edge (s
′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A))
m
→ sl if m is not enabled.
4. The state sl is an absorbing state, i.e., for all a ∈ A we have that sl
a
→ sl.
The reward function r is defined using the reward function r, i.e., r((s, (Y,W,R,A)), a) = r(s, a),
and r((s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)), a) = 1 for all a ∈ A. The reward for the initial state may be set to an
arbitrary value, as the initial state is visited only once. The rewards in the absorbing state sl are
0 for all actions.
In the POMDP G the belief is already included in the state space itself of the POMDP, and the
belief represents exactly the set of states in which the POMDP can be with positive probability.
Hence we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7. The POMDP G is a belief-observation PODMP.
We now show that the existence of a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the objec-
tive LimAvg=1 in POMDP G implies the existence of a randomized memoryless almost-sure winning
strategy in the POMDP G and vice versa.
Lemma 8. If there exists a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the LimAvg=1 objective
with the reward function r in the POMDP G, then there exists a memoryless almost-sure winning
strategy for the LimAvg=1 objective with the reward function r in the POMDP G.
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Proof. Assume there is a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy σ in the POMDP G, then
the collapsed strategy σ′ = (σ′u, σ
′
n,M, ({s0},W,R,A)) = CoSt(σ) is also an almost-sure winning
strategy in the POMDP G. We define the memoryless strategy σ : O → D(A) as follows:
• In the initial observation {s0} play the action ({s0},W,R,A).
• In observation (Y,W,R,A) play σ((Y,W,R,A)) = σ′n((Y,W,R,A)).
• In observation (Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) we denote by o the unique observation such that Y ′ ⊆
γ−1(o), then σ(Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) = σ′u((Y,W,R,A), o, a).
• In the observation {sl} no matter what is played the loosing absorbing state is not left.
Let G1 = G↾σ′ and G2 = G↾σ. We will for simplicity collapse the edges in the Markov Chain G2,
i.e., we will consider an edge (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→ (s′, (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′)) whenever (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→
(s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A))
(Y ′,W ′,R′,A′)
→ (s′, (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′)). Note that in the first step the Markov chain
G2 reaches a state (s0, ({s0},W,R,A)), and one can observe that the Markov chains reachable from
the initial state in G1 and the state (s0, ({s0},W,R,A)) in G2 are isomorphic (when collapsed edge
are considered). By Lemma 1, all the reachable recurrent classes in the Markov chain G1 have all
the rewards equal to 1. As all the intermediate states in the Markov chain G2 that were collapsed
have reward according to r equal to 1 for all the actions, it follows that all the reachable recurrent
classes in G2 have all the rewards assigned by the reward function r equal to 1. By Lemma 1 it
follows that σ is a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy in the POMDP G for the objective
LimAvg=1.
Lemma 9. If there exists a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy for the LimAvg=1 objective
with the reward function r in the POMDP G, then there exists a finite-memory almost-sure winning
strategy for the LimAvg=1 objective withe the reward function r in the POMDP G.
Proof. Let σ be a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy. Intuitively we use everything from
the state except the first component as the memory in the constructed finite-memory strategy
σ = (σu, σn,M,m0), i.e.,
• σn((Y,W,R,A)) = σ((Y,W,R,A));
• σu((Y,W,R,A), o, a) we update uniformly to the elements from the set
Supp(σ((Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)))), where Y ′ is the belief update from Y under observation
o and action a.
• m0 = σ({s
′
0}), this can be in general a probability distribution, in our setting the initial
memory is deterministic. However, this can modeled by adding an additional initial state
from which the required memory update is going to be modeled.
For simplicity we collapse edges in the Markov chain G2 = G ↾σ and write (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→
(s′, (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′)) whenever (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→ (s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A))
(Y ′,W ′,R′,A′)
→
(s′, (Y ′,W ′, R′, A′)). One can observe that the graphs reachable from the state (s0, ({s0},W,R,A))
in the Markov chain G1 = G ↾σ and the state (s0, ({s0},W,R,A)) in the Markov chain G2 are
isomorphic when the collapsed edges are considered. As the strategy σ is almost-sure winning, it
follows that the loosing absorbing state is not reachable in G2, and by Lemma 1, in every reachable
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recurrent class all the rewards are 1. It follows that in every reachable recurrent class in G1 all the
rewards are 1 and the desired result follows.
3.3.2 Polynomial time algorithm for belief-observation POMDPs
We will present a polynomial-time algorithm to determine the set of states from which there exists
a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy for the objective LimAvg=1 in the belief-observation
POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0).
For simplicity in presentation we enhance the belief-observation POMDP G with an additional
function Γ : O → P(A) \ ∅ denoting the set of actions that are available for an observation, i.e., in
this part we will consider POMDPs to be a tuple Red(G) = G = (S,A, δ,O, γ,Γ, s0). Note that this
does not increase the expressive power of the model, as an action not available in an observation
may be simulated by an edge leading to a loosing absorbing state.
Almost-sure winning observations. Given a POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ,Γ, s0) and an objective
ψ, let AlmostM(ψ) denote the set of observations o ∈ O, such that there exists a memoryless almost-
sure winning strategy ensuring the objective from every state s ∈ γ−1(o), i.e., AlmostM(ψ) = {o ∈
O | there exists a memoryless strategy σ, such that for all s ∈ γ−1(o) we have Pσs (ψ) = 1}. Our
goal is to compute the set AlmostM(LimAvg=1) given the belief-observation POMDP G = Red(G).
Our algorithm will reduce the computation to safety and reachability objectives which are defined
as follows:
• Reachability and safety objectives. Given a set T ⊆ S of target states, the reachability objec-
tive Reach(T ) = {(s0, a0, s1, a1, s2 . . .) ∈ Ω | ∃k ≥ 0 : sk ∈ T} requires that a target state in
T is visited at least once. Dually, the safety objective Safe(F ) = {(s0, a0, s1, a1, s2 . . .) ∈ Ω |
∀k ≥ 0 : sk ∈ F} requires that only states in F are visited.
In the first step of the computation of the winning observations, we will restrict the set of
available actions in the belief-observation POMDP G. Observe, that any almost-sure winning
strategy must avoid reaching the loosing absorbing state sl. Therefore, we restrict the actions in
the POMDP to only so called allowable or safe actions.
• (Allow). Given a set of observations O ⊆ O and an observation o ∈ O we define by Allow(o,O)
the set of actions that when played in observation o (in any state γ−1(o)) ensure that the
next observation is in O, i.e.,
Allow(o,O) = {a ∈ Γ(o) |
⋃
s∈γ−1(o)
γ(Supp(δ(s, a))) ⊆ O}
We will denote by Sgood = S \ sl the set of states of the POMDP without the loosing absorb-
ing state. We compute the set of observations AlmostM(Safe(Sgood)) from which there exists a
memoryless strategy ensuring almost-surely that the loosing absorbing state sl is not visited.
We construct a restricted POMDP G˜ = (S˜, A˜, δ˜, O˜, γ˜, Γ˜, s˜0), where A˜ = A, s˜0 = s0 and the rest
is defined as follows:
• the set of states is restricted to S˜ = γ−1(AlmostM(Safe(Sgood))),
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• the set of safe actions available in observation o˜ are
Γ˜(o˜) = Γ(o˜) ∩ Allow(o˜,AlmostM(Safe(Sgood)))
• the transition function δ˜ is defined as δ but restricted to states S˜, and
• the observation O˜ = AlmostM(Safe(Sgood)) and the observation mapping γ˜ is defined as γ
restricted to states S˜.
Note that any memoryless almost-sure winning strategy σ for the objective LimAvg=1 on the
POMDP G can be interpreted on the restricted POMDP G˜ as playing an action from the set
Γ(o) \ Γ˜(o) or reaching a state in S \ S˜ leads to a contradiction to the fact that σ is an almost-sure
winning strategy (the loosing absorbing state is reached with positive probability). Similarly due to
the fact that the POMDP G is a belief-observation POMDP it follows that the restricted POMDP
G˜ is also a belief-observation POMDP.
We define a subset of states of the belief-observation POMDP G˜ that intuitively correspond
to winning collapsed-recurrent states (wcs), i.e., S˜wcs = {(s, (Y,W,R,A)) | W (s) = 1, R(s) = 1}.
Finally we compute the set of observations A˜W = AlmostM(Reach(Swcs)) in the restricted belief-
observation POMDP G˜. We show that the set of observations A˜W is equal to the set of observations
AlmostM(LimAvg=1) in the POMDP G. In the following two lemmas we establish the required
inclusions:
Lemma 10. A˜W ⊆ AlmostM(LimAvg=1).
Proof. Let σ˜ be a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy for the objective Reach(S˜wcs) from
every state that has observation o˜ in the POMDP G˜, for all o˜ in A˜W. We will show that the
strategy σ˜ also almost-surely ensures the LimAvg=1 objective in POMDP G.
Consider the Markov chain G↾σ˜. As the strategy σ˜ plays in the POMDP G˜ that is restricted
only to actions that keep the game in observations AlmostM(Safe(Sgood)) it follows that the loosing
absorbing state sl is not reachable in the Markov chain G↾σ˜. Also the strategy ensures that the set
of states S˜wcs is reached with probability 1 in the Markov chain G↾σ˜.
Let (s, (Y,W,R,A))
a
→ (s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) be an edge in the Markov chain G↾σ˜ and assume
that (s, (Y,W,R,A)) ∈ S˜wcs , i.e., W (s) = 1 and R(s) = 1. The only actions (Y
′,W ′, R′, A′)
available in the state (s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) are enabled actions that satisfy:
• for all ŝ ∈ Y , if W (ŝ) = 1, then for all ŝ′ ∈ Supp(δ(ŝ, a)) ∩ Y ′ we have W ′(ŝ′) = 1, and
• for all ŝ ∈ Y , if R(ŝ) = 1, then for all ŝ′ ∈ Supp(δ(ŝ, a)) ∩ Y ′ we have R′(ŝ′) = 1.
It follows that all the states reachable in one step from (s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) are also in S˜wcs .
Similarly, for every enabled action in state (s, (Y,W,R,A)) we have that for all s ∈ Y , if W (s) = 1
and R(s) = 1, then r(s, a) = 1. Therefore, all the rewards r from states in S˜wcs are 1, and all the
intermediate states (s′, Y ′, a, (Y,W,R,A)) have reward 1 by definition. This all together ensures
that after reaching the set S˜wcs only rewards 1 are received, and as the set S˜wcs is reached with
probability 1, it follows by Lemma 1 that σ˜ is an almost-sure winning strategy in the POMDP G
for the LimAvg=1 objective.
Lemma 11. AlmostM(LimAvg=1) ⊆ A˜W.
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Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exists an observation o˜ ∈ AlmostM(LimAvg=1) \
A˜W. As we argued before, the observation o˜must belong to the set AlmostM(Safe(Sgood)), otherwise
with positive probability the loosing absorbing state sl is reached.
As o˜ ∈ AlmostM(LimAvg=1) there exists a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy σ in the
POMDP G for the objective LimAvg=1. By Lemma 9 there exists a finite-memory almost-sure
winning strategy σ in POMDP G for the LimAvg=1 objective and by Theorem 2 there exists a
finite-memory almost-sure winning collapsed strategy σ′ = CoSt(σ) in POMDP G.
Let (s, (Y,W,R,A)) be a reachable collapsed-recurrent state in the Markov chain G↾σ. Then
by the definition of collapsed-recurrent states we have that R(s) = 1, and as the strategy σ′ is
almost-sure winning we also have that W (s) = 1, i.e., if we consider the state (s, (Y,W,R,A))
of the POMDP G we obtain that the state belongs to the set S˜wcs . Note that by Lemma 5 the
set of collapsed-recurrent states in the Markov chain G↾σ′ is reached with probability 1. By the
construction presented in Lemma 8 we obtain a memoryless almost-sure winning strategy σ for the
objective LimAvg=1 in the POMDP G. Moreover, we have that the Markov chains G↾σ′ and G↾σ
are isomorphic when simplified edges are considered. In particular it follows that the set of states
S˜wcs is reached with probability 1 in the Markov chain G↾σ and therefore σ is a witness strategy
for the fact that the observation o˜ belongs to the set A˜W. The contradiction follows.
To complete the computation for almost-sure winning for LimAvg=1 objectives we now present
polynomial time solutions for almost-sure safety and almost-sure reachability objectives for ran-
domized memoryless strategies in the belief-observation POMDP G. We start with a few notations
below:
• (Pre). The predecessor function given a set of observations O selects the observations o ∈ O
such that Allow(o,O) is non-empty , i.e.,
Pre(O) = {o ∈ O | Allow(o,O) 6= ∅}.
• (Apre). Given a set Y ⊆ O of observations and a set X ⊆ S of states such that X ⊆ γ−1(Y ),
the set Apre(Y ,X) denotes the states from γ−1(Y ) such that there exists an action that
ensures that the next observation is in Y and the set X is reached with positive probability,
i.e.,:
Apre(Y ,X) = {s ∈ γ−1(Y ) | ∃a ∈ Allow(γ(s), Y ) such that Supp(δ(s, a)) ∩X 6= ∅}.
• (ObsCover). For a set U ⊆ S of states we define the ObsCover(U) ⊆ O to be the set of
observations o such that all states with observation o are in U , i.e., ObsCover(U ) = {o ∈ O |
γ−1(o) ⊆ U}.
Using the above notations we present the solution of almost-sure winning for safety and reachability
objectives.
Almost-sure winning for safety objectives. Given a safety objective Safe(F ), for a set F ⊆ S
of states, let OF = ObsCover(F ) denote the set of observations o such that γ
−1(o) ⊆ F , i.e., all
states s ∈ γ−1(o) belong to F . We denote by νX the greatest fixpoint and by µX the least fixpoint.
Let
Y ∗ = νY.(OF ∩ Pre(Y )) = νY.(ObsCover(F ) ∩ Pre(Y ))
be the greatest fixpoint of the function f(Y ) = OF ∩ Pre(Y ). Then the set Y
∗ is obtained by the
following computation:
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1. Y0 ← OF ; and
2. repeat Yi+1 ← Pre(Yi) until a fixpoint is reached.
We show that Y ∗ = AlmostM(Safe(F )).
Lemma 12. For every observation o ∈ Y ∗ we have Allow(o, Y ∗) 6= ∅ (i.e., Allow(o, Y ∗) is non-
empty).
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exists an observation o ∈ Y ∗ such that Allow(o, Y ∗)
is empty. Then o 6∈ Pre(Y ∗) and hence the observation must be removed in the next iteration of
the algorithm. This implies Pre(Y ∗) 6= Y ∗, we reach a contradiction that Y ∗ is a fixpoint.
Lemma 13. The set Y ∗ is the set of almost-sure winning observations for the safety objective
Safe(F ), i.e., Y ∗ = AlmostM(Safe(F )), and can be computed in linear time.
Proof. We prove the two desired inclusions: (1) Y ∗ ⊆ AlmostM(Safe(F )); and
(2) AlmostM(Safe(F )) ⊆ Y
∗.
1. (First inclusion). By the definition of Y0 we have that γ
−1(Y0) ⊆ F . As Yi+1 ⊆ Yi we
have that γ−1(Y ∗) ⊆ F . By Lemma 12, for all observations o ∈ Y ∗ we have Allow(o, Y ∗) is
non-empty. A pure memoryless that plays some action from Allow(o, Y ∗) in o, for o ∈ Y ∗,
ensures that the next observation is in Y ∗. Thus the strategy ensures that only states from
γ−1(Y ∗) ⊆ F are visited, and therefore is an almost-sure winning strategy for the safety
objective.
2. (Second inclusion). We prove that there is no almost-sure winning strategy from O \ Y ∗ by
induction:
• (Base case). There is no almost-sure winning strategy from observations O \ Y0. Note
that Y0 = OF . In every observation o ∈ O \ Y0 there exists a state s ∈ γ
−1(o) such that
s 6∈ F . As G is a belief-observation POMDP there is a positive probability of being in
state s, and therefore not being in F .
• (Inductive step). We show that there is no almost-sure winning strategy from obser-
vations in O\Yi+1. Let Yi+1 6= Yi and o ∈ Yi \Yi+1 (or equivalently (O\Yi+1)\ (O\Yi)).
As the observation o is removed from Yi it follows that Allow(o, Yi) = ∅. It follows that no
matter what action is played, there is a positive probability of being in a state s ∈ γ−1(o)
such that playing the action would leave the set γ−1(Yi) with positive probability, and
thus reaching the observations O\Yi from which there is no almost-sure winning strategy
by induction hypothesis.
This shows that Y ∗ = AlmostM(Safe(F )), and the linear time computation follows from the straight
forward computation of greatest fixpoints. The desired result follows.
Almost-sure winning for reachability objectives. Consider a set T ⊆ S of target states, and
the reachability objective Reach(T ). We will show that:
AlmostM(Reach(T )) = νZ.ObsCover(µX.((T ∩ γ
−1(Z)) ∪ Apre(Z,X))).
Let Z∗ = νZ.ObsCover(µX.((T ∩ γ−1(Z)) ∪ Apre(Z,X))). In the following two lemmas we
show the two desired inclusions, i.e., AlmostM(Reach(T )) ⊆ Z
∗ and then we show that Z∗ ⊆
AlmostM(Reach(T )).
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Lemma 14. AlmostM(Reach(T )) ⊆ Z
∗.
Proof. Let W ∗ = AlmostM(Reach(T )). We first show that W
∗ is a fixpoint of the function
f(Z) = ObsCover(µX.((T ∩ γ−1(Z)) ∪ Apre(Z,X))),
i.e., we will show that W ∗ = ObsCover(µX.((T ∩ γ−1(W ∗))∪Apre(W ∗,X))) . As Z∗ is the greatest
fixpoint it will follow that W ∗ ⊆ Z∗. Let
X∗ = (µX.((T ∩ γ−1(W ∗)) ∪ Apre(W ∗,X))),
and X̂∗ = ObsCover(X∗). Note that by definition we have X∗ ⊆ γ−1(W ∗) as the inner fixpoint
computation only computes states that belong to γ−1(W ∗). Assume towards contradiction that
W ∗ is not a fixpoint, i.e., X̂∗ is a strict subset of W ∗. For all states s ∈ γ−1(W ∗) \ X∗, for all
actions a ∈ Allow(γ(s),W ∗) we have Supp(δ(s, a)) ⊆ (γ−1(W ∗) \ X∗). Consider any randomized
memoryless almost-sure winning strategy σ∗ from W ∗ and we consider two cases:
1. Suppose there is a state s ∈ γ−1(W ∗) \ X∗ such that an action that does not belong to
Allow(γ(s),W ∗) is played with positive probability by σ∗. Then with positive probability
the observations from W ∗ are left (because from some state with same observation as s an
observation in the complement of W ∗ is reached with positive probability). Since from the
complement of W ∗ there is no randomized memoryless almost-sure winning strategy (by
definition), it contradicts that σ∗ is an almost-sure winning strategy from W ∗.
2. Otherwise for all states s ∈ γ−1(W ∗)\X∗ the strategy σ∗ plays only actions in Allow(γ(s),W ∗),
and then the probability to reach X∗ is zero, i.e., Safe(γ−1(W ∗) \ X∗) is ensured. Since
all target states in γ−1(W ∗) belong to X∗ (they get included in iteration 0 of the fixpoint
computation) it follows that (γ−1(W ∗) \ X∗) ∩ T = ∅, and hence Safe(γ−1(W ∗) \ X∗) ∩
Reach(T ) = ∅, and we again reach a contradiction that σ∗ is an almost-sure winning strategy.
It follows that W ∗ is a fixpoint, and thus we get that W ∗ ⊆ Z∗.
Lemma 15. Z∗ ⊆ AlmostM(Reach(T )).
Proof. Since the goal is to reach the set T , wlog we assume the set T to be absorbing. We define
a randomized memoryless strategy σ∗ for the objective AlmostM(Reach(T )) as follows: for an
observation o ∈ Z∗, play all actions from the set Allow(o, Z∗) uniformly at random. Since the
strategy σ∗ plays only actions in Allow(o, Z∗), for o ∈ Z∗, it ensures that the set of states γ−1(Z∗)
is not left, (i.e., Safe(γ−1(Z∗)) is ensured). We now analyze the computation of the inner fixpoint,
i.e., analyze the computation of µX.((T ∩ γ−1(Z∗)) ∪ Apre(Z∗,X))) as follows:
• X0 = (T ∩ γ
−1(Z∗)) ∪ Apre(Z∗, ∅))) = T ∩ γ−1(Z∗) ⊆ T (since Apre(Z∗, ∅) is ∅);
• Xi+1 = (T ∩ γ
−1(Z∗)) ∪ Apre(Z∗,Xi)))
Note that we have X0 ⊆ T . For every state sj ∈ Xj the set of played actions Allow(γ(sj), Z
∗)
contains an action a such that Supp(δ(sj, a))∩Xj−1 is non-empty. Let C be an arbitrary reachable
recurrent class in the Markov chain G↾ σ∗ reachable from a state in γ−1(Z∗). Since Safe(γ−1(Z∗))
is ensured, it follows that C ⊆ γ−1(Z∗). Consider a state in C that belongs to Xj \Xj−1 for j ≥ 1.
Since the strategy ensures that for some action a played with positive probability we must have
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Supp(δ(sj , a)) ∩ Xj−1 6= ∅, it follows that C ∩ Xj−1 6= ∅. Hence by induction C ∩ X0 6= ∅. It
follows C ∩ T 6= ∅. Hence all reachable recurrent classes C that intersect with Z∗ are contained
in Z∗, but not contained in Z∗ \ T , i.e., all reachable recurrent classes are the absorbing states
in T . Thus the strategy σ∗ ensures that T is reached with probability 1. Thus we have Z∗ ⊆
AlmostM(Reach(T )).
Lemma 16. The set AlmostM(Reach(T )) can be computed in quadratic time for belief-observation
POMDPs, for target set T ⊆ S.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 14 and Lemma 15.
The EXPTIME-completeness. In this section we first showed that given a POMDP G with
a LimAvg=1 objective we can construct an exponential size belief-observation POMDP G and the
computation of the almost-sure winning set for LimAvg=1 objectives is reduced to the computation
of the almost-sure winning set for safety and reachability objectives, for which we established
linear and quadratic time algorithms respectively. This gives us an 2O(|S|+|A|) time algorithm to
decide (and construct if one exists) the existence of finite-memory almost-sure winning strategies
in POMDPs with LimAvg=1 objectives. The EXPTIME-hardness for almost-sure winning easily
follows from the result of Reif for two-player partial-observation games with safety objectives [24]:
(i) First observe that in POMDPs, if almost-sure safety is violated, then it is violated in a finite
prefix which has positive probability, and hence for almost-sure safety, the probabilistic player
can be treated as an adversary. This shows that the almost-sure safety problem for POMDPs is
EXPTIME-hard. (ii) The almost-sure safety problem reduces to almost-sure winning for limit-
average objectives by assigning reward 1 to safe states, reward 0 to non-safe states and make
the non-safe states absorbing. It follows that POMDPs with almost-sure winning for LimAvg=1
objectives under finite-memory strategies is EXPTIME-hard.
Theorem 3. The following assertions hold:
1. Given a POMDP G with |S| states, |A| actions, and a LimAvg=1 objective, the existence (and
the construction if one exists) of a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy can be achieved
in 2O(|S|+|A|) time.
2. The decision problem of given a POMDP and a LimAvg=1 objective whether there exists a
finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy is EXPTIME-complete.
4 Finite-memory strategies with Quantitative Constraint
We will show that the problem of deciding whether there exists a finite-memory (as well as an
infinite-memory) almost-sure winning strategy for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
is undecidable. We
present a reduction from the standard undecidable problem for probabilistic finite automata (PFA).
A PFA P = (S,A, δ, F, s0) is a special case of a POMDP G = (S,A, δ,O, γ, s0) with a single
observation O = {o} such that for all states s ∈ S we have γ(s) = o. Moreover, the PFA proceeds
for only finitely many steps, and has a set F of desired final states. The strict emptiness problem
asks for the existence of a strategy w (a finite word over the alphabet A) such that the measure
of the runs ending in the desired final states F is strictly greater than 12 ; and the strict emptiness
problem for PFA is undecidable [20].
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Reduction. Given a PFA P = (S,A, δ, F, s0) we construct a POMDP G = (S
′,A′, δ′,O, γ, s′0)
with a Boolean reward function r such that there exists a word w ∈ A∗ accepted with probability
strictly greater than 12 in P iff there exists a finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy in G for
the objective LimAvg> 1
2
. Intuitively, the construction of the POMDP G is as follows: for every
state s ∈ S of P we construct a pair of states (s, 1) and (s, 0) in S′ with the property that (s, 0)
can only be reached with a new action $ (not in A) played in state (s, 1). The transition function
δ′ from the state (s, 0) mimics the transition function δ, i.e., δ′((s, 0), a)((s′, 1)) = δ(s, a)(s′). The
reward r of (s, 1) (resp. (s, 0)) is 1 (resp. 0), ensuring the average of the pair to be 12 . We add
a new available action # that when played in a final state reaches a state good ∈ S′ with reward
1, and when played in a non-final state reaches a state bad ∈ S′ with reward 0, and for states
good and bad given action # the next state is the initial state. An illustration of the construction
on an example is depicted on Figure 5. Whenever an action is played in a state where it is not
available, the POMDP reaches a loosing absorbing state, i.e., an absorbing state with reward 0,
and for brevity we omit transitions to the loosing absorbing state. The formal construction of the
POMDP G is as follows:
• S′ = (S × {0, 1}) ∪ {good, bad},
• s′0 = (s0, 1),
• A′ = A ∪ {#, $},
• The actions a ∈ A ∪ {#} in states (s, 1) (for s ∈ S) lead to the loosing absorbing state; the
action $ in states (s, 0) (for s ∈ S) leads to the loosing absorbing states; and the actions
a ∈ A ∪ {$} in states good and bad lead to the loosing absorbing state. The other tran-
sitions are as follows: For all s ∈ S: (i) δ′((s, 1), $)((s, 0)) = 1, (ii) for all a ∈ A we have
δ′((s, 0), a)((s′, 1)) = δ(s, a)(s′), and (iii) for action # we have
δ′((s, 0),#)(good) =
{
1 if s ∈ F
0 otherwise
δ′((s, 0),#)(bad) =
{
1 if s 6∈ F
0 otherwise
δ′(good,#)(s′0) = 1 δ
′(bad,#)(s′0) = 1,
• there is a single observation O = {o}, and all the states s ∈ S′ have γ(s) = o.
We define the Boolean reward function r only as a function of the state, i.e., r : S′ → {0, 1} and
show the undecidability even for this special case of reward functions. For all s ∈ S the reward is
r((s, 0)) = 0, and similarly r((s, 1)) = 1, and the remaining two states have rewards r(good) = 1 and
r(bad) = 0. Note that though the rewards are assigned as function of states, the rewards appear
on the transitions. We now establish the correctness of the reduction.
Lemma 17. If there exists a word w ∈ A∗ accepted with probability strictly greater than 12 in
P, then there exists a pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy in the POMDP G for the
objective LimAvg> 1
2
.
Proof. Let w ∈ A∗ be a word accepted in P with probability µ > 12 and let the length of the
word be |w| = n. We construct a pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the ob-
jective LimAvg> 1
2
objective in the POMDP G as follows: We denote by w[i] the ith action in
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Figure 5: Transformation of the PFA P to a POMDP G
the word w. The finite-memory strategy we construct is specified as an ultimately periodic word
($ w[1] $ w[2] . . . $w[n] # #)ω. Observe that by the construction of the POMDP G, the sequence
of rewards (that appear on the transitions) is (10)n followed by (i) 1 with probability µ (when F
is reached), and (ii) 0 otherwise; and the whole sequence is repeated ad infinitum. Also observe
that once the pure finite-memory strategy is fixed we obtain a Markov chain with a single recurrent
class since the starting state belongs to the recurrent class and all states reachable from the starting
state form the recurrent class. We first establish the almost-sure convergence of the sequence of
partial averages of the periodic blocks, and then of the sequences inside the periodic blocks as well.
Almost-sure convergence of periodic blocks. Let r1, r2, r3, . . . be the infinite sequence of rewards and
sj =
1
j
·
∑j
i=1 ri. The infinite sequence of rewards can be partitioned into blocks of length 2 ·n+1,
intuitively corresponding to the transitions of a single run on the word ($w[1] $w[2] . . . $w[n]##).
We define a random variable Xi denoting average of rewards of the i
th block in the sequence, i.e.,
with probability µ for all i the value of Xi is
n+1
2·n+1 and with probability 1 − µ the value is
n
2·n+1 .
The expected value of Xi is therefore equal to E(Xi) =
µ+n
2·n+1 , and as we have that µ >
1
2 it follows
that E(Xi) >
1
2 . The fact that we have a single recurrent class and after the ## the initial state
is reached implies that the random variable sequence (Xi)i≥0 is an infinite sequence of i.i.d’s. By
the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) [8, Theorem 7.1, page 56] we have that
P
(
lim
j→∞
1
j
(X1 +X2 + . . .+Xj) =
µ+ n
2 · n+ 1
)
= 1
Almost-sure convergence inside the periodic blocks. It follows that with probability 1 the LimAvg of
the partial averages on blocks is strictly greater than 12 . As the blocks are of fixed length 2 ·n+1, if
we look at the sequence of averages at every 2 · n+ 1 step, i.e., the sequence sj·(2n+1) for j > 0, we
have that this sequence converges with probability 1 to a value strictly greater than 12 . It remains
to show that all si converge to that value. As the elements of the subsequence converging with
probability 1 are always separated by exactly 2 · n+1 elements (i.e., constant number of elements)
and due to the definition of LimAvg the deviation introduced by these 2 ·n+1 elements ultimately
gets smaller than any ǫ > 0 as the length of the path increases (the average is computed from the
whole sequence so far, and deviation caused by a fixed length is negligible as the length increases).
Therefore the whole sequence (si)i>0 converges to a value strictly greater than
1
2 with probability 1.
It follows that the strategy ensures LimAvg> 1
2
with probability 1.
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In the next two lemmas we first show the other direction for pure finite-memory strategies and
then extend the result to the class of randomized infinite-memory strategies.
Lemma 18. If there exists a pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy in the POMDP G
for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
, then there exists a word w ∈ A∗ accepted with probability strictly greater
than 12 in P .
Proof. Assume there exists a pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy σ for the objective
LimAvg> 1
2
. Observe that as there is only a single observation in the POMDP G the strategy σ can
be viewed as an ultimately periodic infinite word of the form u · vω, where u, v are finite words
from A′. Note that v must contain the subsequence ##, as otherwise the LimAvg would be only
1
2 . Similarly, before every letter a ∈ A in the words u, v, the strategy must necessarily play the $
action, as otherwise the loosing absorbing state is reached.
In the first step we align the ## symbols in v. Let us partition the word v into two parts
v = y · x such that y is the shortest prefix ending with ##. Then the ultimately periodic word
u · y · (x · y)ω = u · vω is also a strategy ensuring almost-surely LimAvg> 1
2
. Due to the previous step
we consider u′ = u · y and v′ = x · y, and thus have that v′ is of the form:
$w1[1]$w1[2] . . . $w1[n1]##$w2[1]$w2[2] . . . $w2[n2]## . . . $wm[1]$wm[2] . . . $wm[nm]##
We extract the set of words W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} from v
′. Assume towards contradiction that all
the words in the set W are accepted in the PFA P with probability at most 12 . As in Lemma 17
we define a random variable Xi denoting the average of rewards after reading v
′. It follows that
the expected value of E(Xi) ≤
1
2 for all i ≥ 0. By using SLLN we obtain that almost-surely the
LimAvg of u · vω is E(Xi), and hence it is not possible as u · v
ω is an almost-sure winning strategy
for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
. We reach a contradiction to the assumption that all the words in W
are accepted with probability at most 12 in P. Therefore there exists a word w ∈W that is accepted
in P with probability strictly greater than 12 , which concludes the proof.
To complete the reduction we show in the following lemma that pure strategies are sufficient
for the POMDPs constructed in our reduction.
Lemma 19. Given the POMDP G of our reduction, if there is a randomized (possibly infinite-
memory) almost-sure winning strategy for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
, then there exists a pure finite-
memory almost-sure winning strategy σ′ for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
.
Proof. Let σ be a randomized (possibly infinite-memory) almost-sure winning strategy for the
objective LimAvg> 1
2
. As there is a single observation in the POMDP G constructed in the reduction,
the strategy does not receive any useful feedback from the play, i.e., the memory update function
σu always receives as one of the parameters the unique observation. Note that the strategy needs to
play the pair ## of actions infinitely often with probability 1, i.e., with probability 1 the resolving
of the probabilities in the strategy σ leads to an infinite word ρ = w1##w2## . . ., as otherwise
the limit-average payoff is at most 12 with positive probability. From each such run ρ we extract
the finite words w1, w2, . . . that occurs in ρ, and then consider the union of all such words as W .
We consider two options:
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1. If there exists a word v inW such that the expected average of rewards after playing this word
is strictly greater than 12 , then the pure strategy v
ω is also a pure finite-memory almost-sure
winning strategy for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
.
2. Assume towards contradiction that all the words in W have the expected reward at most 12 .
Then with probability 1 resolving the probabilities in the strategy σ leads to an infinite word
w = w1##w2## . . ., where each word wi belongs to W , that is played on the POMDP G.
Let us define a random variable Xi denoting the average between i and (i+1)-th occurrence
of ##. The expected average E(Xi) is at most
1
2 for all i. Therefore the expected LimAvg of
the sequence ŵ is at most:
E(lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=0
Xi).
Since Xi’s are non-negative measurable functions, by Fatou’s lemma [8, Theorem 3.5, page 16]
that shows the integral of limit inferior of a sequence of non-negative measurable functions is
at most the limit inferior of the integrals of these functions, we have the following inequality:
E(lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=0
Xi) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
E(
1
n
n∑
i=0
Xi) ≤
1
2
.
Note that since the strategy σ is almost-sure winning for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
, then the
expected value of rewards must be strictly greater than 12 . Thus we arrive at a contradiction.
Hence there must exist a word in W that that has an expected payoff strictly greater than 12
in G.
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4. The problem whether there exists a finite (or infinite-memory) almost-sure winning
strategy in a POMDP for the objective LimAvg> 1
2
is undecidable.
5 Infinite-memory strategies with Qualitative Constraint
In this section we show that the problem of deciding the existence of infinite-memory almost-sure
winning strategies in POMDPs with LimAvg=1 objectives is undecidable. We prove this fact by a
reduction from the value 1 problem in PFA, which is undecidable [10]. The value 1 problem given
a PFA P asks whether for every ǫ > 0 there exists a finite word w such that the word is accepted
in P with probability at least 1− ǫ (i.e., the limit of the acceptance probabilities is 1).
Reduction. Given a PFA P = (S,A, δ, F, s0), we construct a POMDP G
′ = (S′,A′, δ′,O′, γ′, s′0)
with a reward function r′, such that P satisfies the value 1 problem iff there exists an infinite-memory
almost-sure winning strategy in G′ for the objective LimAvg=1. Intuitively, the construction adds
two additional states good and bad. We add an edge from every state of the PFA under a new action
$, this edge leads to the state good when played in a final state, and to the state bad otherwise. In
the states good and bad we add self-loops under a new action #. The action $ in the states good
or bad leads back to the initial state. An example of the construction is illustrated with Figure 6.
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All the states belong to a single observation, and we will use Boolean reward function on states.
The reward for all states except the newly added state good is 0, and the reward for the state good
is 1. The formal construction is as follows:
• S′ = S ∪ {good, bad},
• s′0 = s0,
• A′ = A ∪ {#, $},
• For all s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A we have δ′(s, a)(s′) = δ(s, a)(s′),
δ′(s, $)(good) =
{
1 if s ∈ F
0 otherwise
δ′(s, $)(bad) =
{
1 if s 6∈ F
0 otherwise
δ′(good, $)(s0) = δ
′(bad, $)(s0) = 1,
δ′(good,#)(good) = δ′(bad,#)(bad) = 1
• there is a single observation O = {o}, and all the states s ∈ S′ have γ(s) = o.
s0 s
a
b
s0 s
good
bad
a
b
$
$
#
#
$
$
Figure 6: Transformation of the PFA P to a POMDP G
When an action is played in a state without an outgoing edge for the action, the loosing
absorbing state is reached; i.e., for action # in states in S and actions a ∈ A for states good and
bad, the next state is the loosing absorbing state. The Boolean reward function r′ : S′ → {0, 1}
assigns all states s ∈ S ∪ {bad} the reward r′(s) = 0, and r′(good) = 1.
Lemma 20. If the PFA P satisfies the value 1 problem, then there exists an infinite-memory
almost-sure winning strategy ensuring the LimAvg=1 objective.
Proof. We construct an almost-sure winning strategy σ that we describe as an infinite word. As
P satisfies the value 1 problem, there exists a sequence of finite words (wi)i≥1, such that each wi
is accepted in P with probability at least 1 − 1
2i+1
. We construct an infinite word w1 · $ · #
n1 ·
w2 · $ · #
n2 · · · , where each ni ∈ N is a natural number that satisfies the following condition: let
ki = |wi+1 · $|+
∑i
j=1(|wj · $|+nj) be the length of the word sequence before #
ni+1 , then we must
have ni
ki
≥ 1− 1
i
. In other words, the length ni is long enough such that even if the whole sequence
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of length
∑i
j=1(|wj ·$|+nj) before ni and the sequence of length |wi+1 ·$| is zero’s, the sequence ni
one’s ensures the average is at least 1− 1
i
. Intuitively the condition ensures that even if the rewards
are always 0 for the prefix up to wi · $ of a run, even then a single visit to the good state after wi · $
can ensure the average to be greater 1− 1
i
from the end of #ni up to the point wi+1 · $ ends. We
first argue that if the state bad is visited finitely often with probability 1, then with probability 1
the objective LimAvg=1 is satisfied.
Almost-sure winning if bad only finitely often. Observe that if the state bad appears only finitely
often, then from some j ≥ 0, for all ℓ ≥ j, the state visited after w1 · $ ·#
n1 · w2 · $ ·#
n2 · · ·wℓ · $
is the state good, and then the sequence #nℓ ensures that the payoff from the end of #nℓ up to
the end of wℓ+1 · $ is at least 1 −
1
ℓ
. If the state good is visited, then the sequence of # gives
reward 1, and thus after a visit to the state good, the average only increases in the sequence of #’s.
Hence it follows that lim-inf average of the rewards is at least 1 − 1
i
, for all i ≥ 0 (i.e., for every
i ≥ 0, there exists a point in the path such that the average of the rewards never falls below 1− 1
i
).
Since this holds for all i ≥ 0, it follows that LimAvg=1 is ensured with probability 1, (provided with
probability 1 the state bad appears only finitely often).
The state bad only finitely often. We now need to show that the state bad is visited infinitely often
with probability 0 (i.e., only finitely often with probability 1). We first upper bound the probability
uk+1 to visit the state bad at least k + 1 times, given k visits to state bad. The probability uk+1
is at most 1
2k+1
(1 + 12 +
1
4 + · · · ). The above bound for uk+1 is obtained as follows: following the
visit to bad for k times, the words wj , for j ≥ k are played; and hence the probability to reach
bad decreases by 12 every time the next word is played; and after k visits the probability is always
smaller than 1
2k+1
. Hence the probability to visit bad at least k + 1 times, given k visits, is at
most the sum above, which is 1
2k
. Let Ek denote the event that bad is visited at least k + 1 times
given k visits to bad. Then we have
∑
k≥0 P(Ek) ≤
∑
k≥1
1
2k
< ∞. By Borel-Cantelli lemma [8,
Theorem 6.1, page 47] we know that if the sum of probabilities is finite (i.e.,
∑
k≥0 P(Ek) < ∞),
then the probability that infinitely many of them occur is 0 (i.e., P(lim supk→∞ Ek) = 0). Hence
the probability that bad is visited infinitely often is 0, i.e., with probability 1 bad is visited finitely
often.
It follows that the strategy σ that plays the infinite word w1 · $ · #
n1 · w2 · $ · #
n2 · · · is an
almost-sure winning strategy for the objective LimAvg=1.
Lemma 21. If there exists an infinite-memory almost-sure winning strategy for the objective
LimAvg=1, then the PFA P satisfies the value 1 problem.
Proof. We prove the converse. Consider that the PFA P does not satisfy the value 1 problem,
i.e., there exists a constant c > 0 such that for all w ∈ A∗ we have that the probability that w is
accepted in P is at most 1 − c < 1. We will show that there is no almost-sure winning strategy.
Assume towards contradiction that there exists an infinite-memory almost-sure winning strategy σ
in the POMDP G′. In POMDPs infinite-memory pure strategies are as powerful as infinite-memory
randomized strategies1. Therefore we may assume that the almost-sure winning strategy is given
as an infinite word w. Note that the infinite word w must necessarily contain infinitely many $ and
can be written as w = w1 · $ ·#
n1 · $ · w2 · $ ·#
n2 · $ · · · . Moreover, there must be infinitely many
i > 0 such that the number ni is positive (since only such segments yield reward 1).
1Since in POMDPs there is only the controller making choices, a randomized strategy can be viewed as a distri-
bution over pure strategies, and if there is a randomized strategy to achieve an objective, then there must be a pure
one. This is the key intuition that in POMDPs randomization is not more powerful; for a formal proof, see [4].
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Consider the Markov chain G′↾σ and the rewards on the states of the chain. By the definition
of the reward function r′ all the rewards that correspond to words wi for i > 0 are equal to 0.
Rewards corresponding to the word segment #ni for i > 0 are with probability at most 1− c equal
to 1 and 0 otherwise. Let us for the moment remove the 0 rewards corresponding to words wi for
all i > 0 (removing the reward 0 segments only increases the limit-average payoff), and consider
only rewards corresponding to the segments #ni for all i > 0, we will refer to this infinite sequence
of rewards as ŵ. Let Xi denote the random variable corresponding to the value of the i
th reward
in the sequence ŵ. Then we have that Xi = 1 with probability at most 1− c and 0 otherwise. The
expected LimAvg of the sequence ŵ is then at most:
E(lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=0
Xi).
Since Xi’s are non-negative measurable function, by Fatou’s lemma [8, Theorem 3.5, page 16] that
shows the integral of limit inferior of a sequence of non-negative measurable functions is at most
the limit inferior of the integrals of these functions, we have the following inequality:
E(lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=0
Xi) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
E(
1
n
n∑
i=0
Xi) ≤ 1− c.
If we put back the rewards 0 from words wi for all i > 0, then the expected value can only
decrease. It follows that Eσ(LimAvg) ≤ 1− c. Note that if the strategy σ was almost-sure winning
for the objective LimAvg=1 (i.e., P
σ(LimAvg=1) = 1), then the expectation of the LimAvg payoff
would also be 1 (i.e., Eσ(LimAvg) = 1). Therefore we have reached a contradiction to the fact that
the strategy σ is almost-sure winning, and the result follows.
Theorem 5. The problem whether there exists an infinite-memory almost-sure winning strategy in
a POMDP with the objective LimAvg=1 is undecidable.
6 Conclusion
We studied POMDPs with limit-average objectives under probabilistic semantics. Since for general
probabilistic semantics, the problems are undecidable even for PFA, we focus on the very important
special case of almost-sure winning. For almost-sure winning with qualitative constraint, we show
that belief-based strategies are not sufficient for finite-memory strategies, and establish EXPTIME-
complete complexity for the existence of finite-memory strategies. Given our decidability result,
the next natural questions are whether the result can be extended to infinite-memory strategies,
or to quantitative path constraint. We show that both these problems are undecidable, and thus
establish the precise decidability frontier with optimal complexity. Also observe that contrary to
other classical results for POMDPs where both the finite-memory and infinite-memory problems are
undecidable, for almost-sure winning with qualitative constraint, we show that the finite-memory
problem is decidable (EXPTIME-complete), but the infinite-memory problem is undecidable.
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